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Do the United States Sentencing Guidelines embody a
coherent system of real-offense sentencing? The opinion of
the “remedy majority” in Booker rests, in no small meas-
ure, on an assumption that they do. Writing for the remedy
majority, Justice Breyer determined that Congress wanted
defendants to be sentenced in a uniform fashion based on
their real-world conduct, as opposed to their crimes of con-
viction.1 More specifically, Congress wanted to ensure
similar treatment for defendants whose real-world conduct
was similar, while also ensuring different treatment for
defendants whose real-world conduct was different.2 In
Breyer’s view, the jury-based sentencing procedures envi-
sioned by the Booker dissenters would defeat Congress’s
preferences because, among other things, such procedures
would undermine the scheme of sentencing uniformity
embodied by the Guidelines.3 Thus, he concluded, the jury-
based system should be rejected in favor of a judge-based
system that at least employs the Guidelines on an advisory
basis. The unspoken—but critical—assumption is that
adherence to the Guidelines (expected to be greater in the
judge-based advisory system) actually advances uniformity
goals in a robust fashion. There are good reasons, however,
to doubt this assumption.
To be sure, the Guidelines do a wonderful job of identi-
fying normally relevant offense characteristics and
ensuring that they are taken into account at sentencing.
Yet, this accomplishment does not amount, in and of
itself, to uniformity in any meaningful sense of the term.
Consider, for instance, a sentencing scheme that imposed
the death penalty in every case in which a victim suffered
physical injury, no matter how slight. Such a scheme
would also do a wonderful job of ensuring that a normally
relevant offense characteristic is taken into account at sen-
tencing, but no one would confuse such a scheme with a
coherent system of uniformity. Nor would it even neces-
sarily do a better job of advancing uniformity goals than a
scheme that imposed the same flat sentence on all offend-
ers—a scheme that would at least have the virtue of
avoiding inappropriate sentence enhancements for minor
or unforeseeable injuries.4 The Guidelines, of course, are
not nearly as crude as this hypothetical system, but their
length and technical detail mask a tendency toward some
of the very same types of difficulties.
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This is not to say that the jury-based system of the
Booker dissenters would do a better job of achieving uni-
formity than the advisory system preferred by the
remedy majority. My point, rather, is that neither system
seems especially well suited to advance uniformity objec-
tives. In light of the Guidelines that we have—as
opposed to some sort of hypothetical guidelines that
actually implement a coherent vision of uniformity—the
desire of Congress to achieve uniformity, standing alone,
offers little help in deciding how much weight ought to
be given the Guidelines or what procedures should be
used to implement them. No matter how attractive uni-
formity might be in theory, we should not exalt
uniformity to the detriment of other important objec-
tives as we address the important questions we now
confront about the future of the Guidelines.
The article develops these points as follows. Part I con-
siders the meaning of the term “uniformity,” as the Court
seems to be using it. Part II summarizes key failings of
the Guidelines from a uniformity perspective. Part III dis-
cusses the implications of this uniformity analysis for the
ongoing judicial debate over how much weight ought to be
given the Guidelines after Booker. Part IV suggests a possi-
ble restructuring of the Guidelines. 
I. Framing the Issue: What Is “Uniformity”?
In the Booker remedy opinion, Justice Breyer did not
offer a rigorous definition of uniformity but, broadly
speaking, seemed to have in mind the twin goals of (1)
similar treatment of similarly situated offenders and
(2) different treatment of differently situated
offenders.5 Confusingly, elsewhere in the sentencing
literature, these two goals are sometimes given the sep-
arate labels of “uniformity” and “proportionality,”
respectively.6 In this article, I will follow Booker’s lead
in using “uniformity” to embrace both objectives.
Where necessary, I will disaggregate the problems of
inappropriately similar treatment from inappropriately
different treatment by referring to “false positives”
(i.e., imposing different sentences on offenders who
are actually similarly situated) and “false negatives”
(i.e., imposing similar sentences on offenders who are
actually differently situated).
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The Booker remedy opinion offers hypothetical exam-
ples of these problems, which it uses to illustrate the
drawbacks of a charge-offense system. First, there are the
contrasting cases of “Smith” and “Jones,” both of whom
violate the Hobbs Act:
Smith threatens to injure a co-worker unless the co-
worker advances him a few dollars from the interstate
company’s till; Jones, after similarly threatening the co-
worker, causes far more harm by seeking far more
money, by making certain that the co-worker’s family
is aware of the threat, by arranging for deliveries of
dead animals to the co-worker’s home to show he is
serious, and so forth.7
Although the behavior of Smith and Jones is very dif-
ferent (in the words of the remedy majority, “the known
harmful consequences of their actions are different”), a
charge-offense system would result in the same sentence
in both cases because the same statute has been violated.8
This is an example of a false negative: Jones’s sentence is
not enhanced relative to Smith’s, although it should be.
Second, there are the contrasting cases of the former
felons “Johnson” and “Jackson”:
[E]ach . . . engages in identical criminal behavior:
threatening a bank teller with a gun, securing $10,000,
and injuring an innocent bystander while fleeing the
bank. Suppose prosecutors charge Johnson with one
crime (say, illegal gun possession) and Jackson with
another (say, bank robbery).9
Under a charge-offense system, the prosecutor’s charging
decision makes all the difference, producing inappropri-
ately different sentences for Johnson and Jackson. This
would be an example of a false positive. 
All of this analysis, of course, assumes some sort of
coherent underlying theory of sentencing. After all, every
case is unique in some way. We cannot speak of unifor-
mity in any meaningful sense without some ability to
distinguish which characteristics ought to result in differ-
ent sentences. Indeed, much of the appeal of uniformity
rests on the assumption that uniform sentences will result
in the advancement of the legitimate purposes of punish-
ment in a consistent and principled fashion across the full
range of federal criminal cases.
While the Booker remedy majority does not provide
any systematic elaboration of its views on this point, the
Smith/Jones and Johnson/Jackson hypotheticals suggest
an emphasis on two types of variables in the uniformity
calculus: (1) the “known harmful consequences” of the
offender’s conduct and (2) the offender’s criminal his-
tory. This approach to uniformity resonates with
Congress’s directive that courts “avoid unwarranted sen-
tencing disparities among defendants with similar records
who have been found guilty of similar conduct.”10 This
approach also mirrors the Court’s Eighth Amendment
proportionality analysis.11
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Our definition of uniformity can be refined on this
basis. Holding criminal history constant, uniformity
demands similar treatment for similar conduct and differ-
ent treatment for different conduct. But how do we know
what aspects of conduct count? The statute refers to
“guilty” conduct, while the Court refers to knowledge and
“harmful consequences.” Implicitly, there seems to be
some contemplation of “just deserts,” i.e., a system in
which sentences would be adjusted based on those aspects
of an offender’s conduct that tend to aggravate or mitigate
the moral blameworthiness of that conduct.12
This observation is not intended to equate uniformity
with a strict system of just deserts. Indeed, the emphasis
on criminal history, alongside conduct, is at least arguably
inconsistent with just deserts.13 On the other hand, unifor-
mity cannot be an infinitely malleable concept; the
objective holds little intrinsic appeal if it lacks some sort of
grounding in the leading recognized theories of criminal
punishment, including just deserts. The Court’s apparent
focus on harm and state of mind is perfectly consistent
with this view. Thus, in considering how the Guidelines
actually distinguish among offenders with similar records,
I will assume that just deserts offers an appropriate and
helpful point of reference.
II. The Guidelines’ Uniformity Problems
A. Circumstantial Evidence: History of
the Guidelines
As drafted by the first Commission, the Guidelines were the
product of what Justice Breyer himself has characterized as
a series of “compromises,” perhaps the most important
being the decision to employ past sentencing practices as a
baseline.14 While past practices surely reflected a sensitivity
to the “known harmful consequences” of offenders’ con-
duct, they may have also reflected other considerations that
do not have as clear a bearing on uniformity (penalties for
going to trial, amenability to rehabilitation, disadvantaged
upbringing, parole expectation and so forth). Moreover,
whatever uniformity could be achieved by the averaging of
past practices may have been further diluted by other sorts
of compromises. These include the decisions to limit the
number of offense characteristics as a matter of administra-
tive convenience15 and otherwise to deviate from past
practices as to matters that were of special concern to partic-
ular commissioners, such as the sentencing of white-collar
criminals.16
More importantly, while the Guidelines have retained
the basic framework created by the original Commission, it
is important to recognize that, with respect to many offense
areas, the Guidelines have become every bit as much a
product of Congress as they are of the Commission. This
fact alone, on its face, should raise serious doubts about the
role of uniformity in the Guidelines. Subject to two very
different institutional masters, it would be rather surpris-
ing to discover that the Guidelines embody a coherent
scheme of identifying and assigning weights to relevant
offense characteristics—particularly given the tendency of
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one of those institutions toward ad hoc gestures of con-
demnation of the crime du jour. And, indeed, Congress’s
habitual reliance on crude mandatory minimums—duti-
fully worked into the fabric of the Guidelines by the
Commission, but vigorously criticized by Breyer
himself17—demonstrates the tension between uniformity
ideals and the reality of congressional intervention. One
might also consider Congress’s rejection of the Commis-
sion’s attempt to soften the 100:1 crack cocaine policy,18 the
substantial increases in sentences for economic crimes that
were reluctantly adopted by the Commission in 2003 as a
result of pressure from Congress,19 and Congress’s rewrit-
ing of the Guidelines to toughen the sentencing for child
pornography and sex crimes.20
B. Missing Uniformity Factors
Despite their length and technical detail, the Guidelines
are actually surprisingly silent on a number of important
considerations bearing on the blameworthiness of an
offender’s conduct. Perhaps most notably, the Guidelines
devote little attention to mens rea or motive.21 The Guide-
lines instead focus on the magnitude of actual or
foreseeable harm. Yet, even as to harm, the Guidelines
employ a scattershot, unsystematic approach.22
Consider Smith and Jones, the two extortionists.
They are supposed to get different sentences based on
the different known harmful consequences of their
behavior, which are apparently composed of (1) different
amounts of money sought and (2) different degrees of
fear instilled in the victim and his family. As to the first
offense characteristic, the extortion guideline would dis-
tinguish between Smith and Jones only to the extent that
the monetary loss in the two cases happened to fall into
different recognized loss categories.23 (More will be said
about loss tables in Section D.) As to the second, the
extortion guideline lacks any generalized offense charac-
teristic dealing with victim fear. Instead, the guideline
seems to get at fear through a host of more specific
offense characteristics, such as whether there was a
death threat, a firearm discharge, or a kidnapping. It is
not clear whether any of these enhancements would
apply to Jones or, if so, apply any differently to Jones
than to Smith.
Or consider Johnson and Jackson, the bank robbers. It
appears that the Guidelines would mandate similar sen-
tences based on the identical harm threatened and caused
by their conduct. But should they really be treated the
same? Assume that Jackson’s gun was loaded but John-
son’s was not, indicating that Jackson’s conduct was more
dangerous and reflected an aggravated mens rea. Assume
further that Jackson was negligent in injuring the
bystander while fleeing but that Johnson undertook all
reasonable precautions to prevent any harm from occur-
ring during flight. Neither of these, nor numerous other
potential distinguishing characteristics, would necessarily
be considered under the Guidelines,24 leading to a false
negative in the sentencing of the two robbers.
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To be sure, “missing” sentencing factors may, in prin-
ciple, be taken into account through the departure
mechanism, but departures are never required under the
Guidelines, and, in practice, upward departures, at least,
are quite rare.25 Likewise, missing factors may be taken
into account in the selection of a sentence within a range,
but, again, this would be a purely discretionary matter,
and, in any event, Guidelines ranges are generally quite
narrow. To the extent that a sentencing judge does take
into account the full range of factors bearing on just pun-
ishment, this will, in many cases, be more a result of the
limited unguided discretion allowed by the Guidelines and
less a result of any mandatory uniformity embedded in the
Guidelines.26
C. Dubious Factors
The Guidelines not only exclude some factors that ought
generally to be part of the uniformity analysis but also
include a variety of factors that may undermine unifor-
mity. For instance, the acceptance of responsibility
provision gives rise to substantial sentence differences
based chiefly on the mode of conviction.27 Thus, Jackson
and Johnson—despite identical conduct and identical
records—would almost certainly receive quite different
sentences under the Guidelines if one pled guilty and the
other went to trial. The acceptance provision may or may
not be good policy, but it seems at odds with uniformity
objectives.28 The substantial assistance and fast-track pro-
visions raise similar concerns.29
Apart from such general provisions, the Guidelines
also include a host of dubious offense-specific aggravating
factors. In the robbery guideline, for instance, why are car-
jackers singled out for a special enhancement? Why
should the robbers of financial institutions receive longer
sentences than other sorts of robbers? It is hard to see why
targeting a car or a bank merits extra punishment per se
in the same sort of way as does inflicting bodily injury dur-
ing the course of a robbery.
D. The Problem of Weighting
Even if the Guidelines were to include all of the relevant
uniformity factors (and exclude all of the irrelevant one), the
Guidelines would still not function effectively as a unifor-
mity regime if they did not ascribe an appropriate weight to
each of the factors. Consider Smith and Jones again. If
Jones’s conduct is only a little more blameworthy than
Smith’s, but the Guidelines mandate a dramatically longer
sentence for Jones, then the cause of uniformity may actu-
ally be undermined, not advanced, by the Guidelines. Or
consider the possibility of a third hypothetical extortion
defendant, Baker, who presents a different mix of aggravat-
ing circumstances that place him between Smith and Jones
in blameworthiness. If Baker’s offense characteristics are
given too much weight, or Jones’s too little, then Baker and
Jones might be treated the same—a false negative.
And the Guidelines have indeed been accused of giving
an unjustifiably heavy weight to numerous offense and
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offender characteristics. For instance, two of the most
prominent targets of criticism in this regard have been the
provisions dealing with crack and illegal reentry by
felons.30
More generally, weighting problems are suggested by
the standard Guidelines approach to aggravating circum-
stances: grouping together broad ranges of conduct with
“cliffs” at the margins, i.e., tipping points at which very
small differences in blameworthiness produce sometimes
quite different offense levels. Offenders at the bottom of
the range for a given offense characteristic will have that
characteristic overweighted relative to other offenders with
the same characteristic, while offenders at the top will have
the characteristic underweighted. Thus, a robber causing a
$50,000 loss is treated the same as a robber causing an
$11,000 loss but differently than a robber causing a
$50,001 loss. Robbers who possess or brandish a firearm
receive the same offense level—although these categories
of possessing and brandishing encompass a broad range of
conduct—but the moment the firearm is discharged a
quite different offense level becomes applicable—even
though one can readily imagine circumstances in which
the discharger creates little more danger or fear than the
brandisher. (Imagine, for instance, a wild shot in the air at
some distance from a safely concealed victim versus a gun
brandished menacingly just inches from the victim’s face.) 
To be sure, there may be some balancing out in the
aggregate: some defendants will benefit unfairly by being at
the top of one range but suffer an offsetting detriment by
being at the bottom of another range. Additionally, the cliff
problems are theoretically softened by the Guidelines’ use
of overlapping sentencing ranges, so that different offense
levels do not necessarily produce different sentences. Given
the relative infrequency of top-of-the-range sentences in
practice, though, this safeguard may be more theoretical
than real.31 In any event, the uniformity concerns remain as
to defendants who happen to be at the top or bottom of the
range with respect to multiple offense characteristics. This
concern is exacerbated by the ability of police and prosecu-
tors to manipulate some offense characteristics (e.g., drug
trafficking quantities in sting operations) so as to ensure
that defendants “fall off the cliff.”
A related weighting concern is the double-counting of
offense characteristics. Many guidelines contain a variety
of overlapping characteristics that seem to be getting at
the same underlying concerns. When several such charac-
teristics are triggered in the same case, offense levels may
quickly mount out of proportion to the real blameworthi-
ness of a defendant’s conduct. Thus, for instance, in the
robbery guideline, the weapons and abduction characteris-
tics both seem to be getting at fear and danger caused by
the defendant’s conduct, and they will often be found
together—presumably, few abductions occur without the
defendant at least brandishing a weapon of some kind.
When both characteristics are present—for instance,
when a gun-toting robber briefly abducts a victim (without
causing any bodily injury)—the total enhancement may
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amount to ten levels. By comparison, this is considerably
more than the six-level enhancement for causing a life-
threatening bodily injury. Similarly, I have shown
elsewhere how a minor spill of nontoxic chemicals may
trigger several overlapping characteristics in the environ-
mental sentencing guideline such that the spiller may
receive a longer sentence than other environmental crimi-
nals who put lives in imminent danger.32
Yet, there is a more fundamental weighting problem
embodied in the Guidelines’ version of uniformity: its insis-
tence on national uniformity, without regard to varying
community norms across the country. After all, there is no
objective, universal yardstick to tell us how many months in
prison a death threat is worth, or the discharge of a firearm,
or a serious bodily injury. The moral significance of such
offense characteristics cannot be meaningfully assessed
without reference to community norms, and some commu-
nities will surely weight some offense characteristics quite
differently than will other communities. For instance, as
Judge Broderick once observed in these pages, gun posses-
sion means something quite different in the hunting
cultures of western states than it does in violence-weary
inner cities in the East.33 A national-average weighting
scheme is almost certainly getting the weights quite wrong
in a great many districts. Indeed, Congress actually contem-
plated this possibility and authorized the Commission to
incorporate regional variation into the Guidelines.34 While
the Commission did not take advantage of this authority,
regional variation should not be considered inconsistent
with Congress’s vision of uniformity.
E. Complexity
The Guidelines’ notorious technical complexity under-
mines their uniformity objectives in at least two respects.
First, as Professors Ruback and Wroblewski have demon-
strated, the sheer number of sentencing factors
recognized by the Guidelines diminishes the reliability of
sentencing decisions, that is, the tendency of the process
to produce the same result if repeated.35 Sentencing fac-
tors tend to be defined in the Guidelines such that
reasonable people may differ as to how they should be
applied in particular cases. Think, for instance, of the dis-
tinctions made in the robbery guideline between “bodily
injury” and “serious bodily injury.” The presence of many
such factors can have a dramatic cumulative effect on
overall reliability.36 Empirical studies of Guidelines appli-
cation support this concern, showing, for instance, that
different probation officers given the same set of facts
come up with quite different offense level calculations.37
Second, complexity diminishes the motivation of
judges.38 Research from organizational psychology
demonstrates that “professionals do not like to be told how
to do their jobs, particularly by nonprofessionals,” often
causing detailed rules and procedures to be ignored by
those charged with implementing them.39 As Ruback and
Wroblewski argue, this dynamic of resentment has played
an important role in federal sentencing: “Judges dislike
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their supervisors (i.e., Congress and the Sentencing Com-
mission) specifying procedures for them as if they were
hourly workers, not professionals.”40 There should be lit-
tle wonder that studies found circumvention of the
Guidelines—i.e., the manipulation of fact-finding and
charges of conviction to avoid imposition of a sentence
required by the Guidelines—to be common,41 while
judges were said to be in a state of “rebellion” against the
drug guidelines.42
In light of these reliability and motivation concerns,
there is good reason to doubt whether the system as a
whole has done—or is capable of doing—a good job in
practice of ensuring similar sentences for the similarly sit-
uated and different sentences for the differently situated.
These practical concerns would be just as strong even if
the Guidelines somehow contained all of the right
offense characteristics and weighted them all appropri-
ately. Indeed, there may be something of a Catch-22 here:
the better the Guidelines succeed in specifically identify-
ing and weighting all factors relevant to uniformity, the
more complex the Guidelines will grow—and the less
likely that the Guidelines will result in consistent out-
comes in practice.
F. Prosecutorial Control
Prosecutors retain vast plea-bargaining and charging dis-
cretion under the Guidelines. To be sure, the drafters of
the Guidelines sought to constrain the significance of that
discretion through a real-offense sentencing system,
which theoretically diminishes the importance of the
charges of conviction. However, the drafters apparently
did not fully appreciate the extent of prosecutors’ ability to
undermine the real-offense system through such mecha-
nisms as fact bargaining and substantial assistance
departures.43 On the whole, judges have shown little will-
ingness (or perhaps capacity) to insist on real-offense
sentences in the face of a competing prosecutorial
agenda.44 Thus, in practice, the effectiveness of the Guide-
lines uniformity scheme is limited by the motivation of
prosecutors to implement that scheme faithfully. How-
ever, prosecutors must balance fidelity to the Guidelines
against a host of competing interests, such as speedy case
processing. Studies of Guidelines circumvention tend to
support suspicions that prosecutors have limited
allegience to the uniformity principle.45
G. Summary
The Guidelines do not embody a robust system of sen-
tencing uniformity, but, to borrow Breyer’s own
characterization, a set of “compromises.”46 Uniformity
has been merely one of numerous competing considera-
tions of public policy and political expedience.
The Commission’s compromises may or may not have
been good ones. I do not mean to suggest here that the
Commission ought to have embraced strict uniformity as
the dominant consideration in the Guidelines sentencing
process, which would have entailed, among other things,
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grappling with the extraordinarily difficult challenge of
prosecutorial discretion. Indeed, in light of the Catch-22 of
complexity, uniformity in any truly rigorous form is prob-
ably unattainable. 
In any event, the point is that questions about the
desirability of judicial adherence to the Guidelines as they
exist cannot usefully be equated with questions about the
desirability of uniformity in sentencing as an abstract
proposition.
Consider the remedy dispute in Booker itself. Assume,
for the sake of argument, that Breyer is correct in one of
his central premises: under a voluntary Guidelines sys-
tem, sentences will more frequently be enhanced on the
basis of applicable Guidelines factors than they would be
under the dissenters’ jury-based system. Even if this claim
were true, the result would not necessarily be greater sys-
tem-wide uniformity. The majority’s remedy will likely
produce fewer false negatives (i.e., treating differently situ-
ated defendants the same), but it may produce more false
positives, due, for instance, to the Guidelines’ reliance on
more or less arbitrary cliffs and other dubious sentencing
factors.47 It is not clear, a priori, which effect (false nega-
tives under the dissenters’ remedy or false positives under
the majority’s) would be more pronounced. (Nor is it clear,
in a criminal justice system that otherwise seeks to err in
favor of the defendant, that false negatives should be
regarded as an equally serious problem as false positives.)
In the end, it seems to me that a preference for uniformity
does not really answer the remedy question; the question
must instead be answered by reference to other considera-
tions, such as the likely transaction costs of the jury
system or the contribution of jury decision making to the
perceived legitimacy of sentencing outcomes.
III. Implementing Booker
Viewing the Guidelines as an ad hoc set of compromises,
rather than a coherent uniformity scheme, may help to
illuminate some of the important questions that are being
raised as lower courts try to implement Booker. In particu-
lar, this part will address the debate between Judges
Adelman and Cassell as to the weight that should be given
the Guidelines in the new “advisory” regime. 
In United States v. Ranum, Judge Adelman held that
“under Booker, courts must treat the guidelines as just one
of a number of sentencing factors.”48 In particular, Adel-
man held that sentencing judges must now weigh all of
the sentencing purposes and considerations identified in
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), which are sometimes in conflict with
the Guidelines.49 Judges, he suggested, must resolve those
conflicts on a case-by-case basis, sometimes rejecting the
Guidelines, “so long as the ultimate sentence is reason-
able and carefully supported by reasons tied to the
§ 3553(a) factors.”50
Judge Cassell rejected this approach in United States v.
Wilson, holding that variances from the Guidelines should
be “rare,” i.e., “only in unusual cases for clearly identified
and persuasive reasons.”51 In particular, Cassell objected
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to Adelman’s reliance on offender characteristics at sen-
tencing.52
While the Cassell–Adelman debate touches on a num-
ber of points, the most important for present purposes is
Cassell’s claim that “[h]eavy reliance on the Guidelines is
the only way to implement the congressional directive
[contained in § 3553(a)] for courts to ‘avoid unwarranted
sentencing disparities among defendants with similar
records who have been found guilty of similar conduct.’”53
Cassell argued
If each judge follows his or her own views of ‘just pun-
ishment’ and ‘adequate deterrence,’ the result will be a
system in which prison terms will depend on what the
judge ate for breakfast on the day of sentencing and
other irrelevant factors. . . .
. . . The result will almost inevitably be that defendants
sentenced in the Eastern District of Wisconsin will
serve different sentences for the same offense than
similarly-situated defendants sentenced in the District
of Utah.54
This reasoning suffers from the same flaw as that of
the remedy majority in Booker, that is, equating Guide-
lines adherence with uniformity. Yet, as wee have seen,
the Guidelines distinguish among defendants based on a
host of considerations that have little bearing on the rela-
tive seriousness of their records or blameworthiness of
their conduct. Moreover, even if adherence to the Guide-
lines does diminish the importance of what the judge had
for breakfast on the day of sentencing, it may actually
enhance the importance of what the prosecutor had for
breakfast on the day of plea bargaining. (Indeed, in a
Guidelines regime that embodies not a scientific system
of uniform punishment but a series of ad hoc compro-
mises, one wonders about the digestive influences that
have operated over the years on key Commissioners and
members of Congress.) 
Nor is there any reason to believe that the Cassell test
will do anything to ensure that sentences in Wisconsin are
the same as sentences in Utah. Sentences varied consider-
ably from district to district even before Booker,55 and it is
hard to see how those patterns will change under any ver-
sion of the Booker regime. Such variation is a predictable
result of the Guidelines’ complexity and (in the absence of
rigorous, binding, nationwide standards for charging and
plea bargaining) the exercise of prosecutorial discretion.
Indeed, it is not even clear that such variation is a bad
thing; variation may reflect legitimate differences in com-
munity values and crime-control needs.56
In sum, while there may be a number of compelling
reasons for sentencing judges to give “great weight” to the
Guidelines, a desire to “avoid unwarranted sentencing dis-
parities among defendants with similar records who have
been found guilty of similar conduct” should not be
counted among them. Quite the contrary, variances from
the Guidelines may be used appropriately in some cases to
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soften a number of the disparities that are woven into the
fabric of the Guidelines themselves, such as the crack-
cocaine disparity, the implicit trial penalty of § 3E1.1, and
the endemic phenomena of cliffs and double-counting.
IV. Legislative Responses: Restructuring the Guidelines
After Booker
If the pre-Booker Guidelines regime were viewed as a func-
tional, coherent system of sentencing uniformity, then
there might be a strong case for a legislative response to
Booker that would effectively restore the old regime. On
the other hand, viewing the old regime as a set of ad hoc
compromises diminishes the immediate appeal of restora-
tion. Thus, I share the view of many organizations and
commentators that the Commission and Congress should
take a wait-and-see approach, carefully evaluating the evo-
lution of the new regime over a period of time.57
That said, the discussion of uniformity in this article
leads me to reiterate and expand upon a proposal I have
made elsewhere for restructuring the Guidelines.58 Booker
offers a unique opportunity for Congress and the Com-
mission to revisit the most fundamental structural
decisions that were made in crafting the Guidelines. One
such decision that has proven flawed was the decision to
use a “piecemeal” approach to evaluating offense severity,
that is, enhancing sentences on the basis of a large num-
ber of narrow, decontextualized, and nominally objective
offense characteristics (e.g., did the defendant have a gun,
was it discharged, was anyone hurt, how badly, how much
money was taken, was a bank targeted). 
This piecemeal approach suffers many defects. It tends
to exclude softer, but still enormously important, vari-
ables, such as mens rea. It discourages consideration and
discussion of the moral significance of the offense charac-
teristics that do count, thus draining the sentencing
process of any meaning for the participants apart from the
bottom-line pronouncement of a sentence length. More-
over, because the Commission cannot possibly anticipate
all of the fact patterns to which a guideline will be applied,
the piecemeal approach inevitably leads to the overcount-
ing or undercounting of particular variables in particular
cases. 
Due to its complexity, the piecemeal approach engen-
ders reliability and motivation problems. Its transparency
invites manipulation by police and prosecutors (e.g.,
through fact bargaining or “sentencing entrapment”59). Its
apparent lack of integrity invites ad hoc congressional tin-
kering.
As against the piecemeal approach, I have suggested a
more open-ended inquiry into such broadly defined sen-
tencing factors as dangerousness and mens rea.60
Restructured this way, the Guidelines would assign differ-
ent weights on an offense-specific basis to the varying
degrees to which the sentencing factors are present (e.g.,
extreme, high, moderate, and low danger created by the
defendant’s conduct, relative to other defendants who
have committed the same type of offense). The Guidelines
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would offer several specific examples of fact patterns for
each category, but there would necessarily be a certain
amount of subjectivity in the determinations, at least at
the margins. Additionally, given the breadth of the sen-
tencing factors (e.g., “low danger”), some dissimilar
conduct would necessarily be lumped together.
In light of the subjectivity at the margins, as well as the
use of a smaller number of broader categories within each
offense type, we would effectively abandon the goal of rigor-
ous, nationwide uniformity. On the other hand, it is not clear
that rigorous, nationwide uniformity can be achieved in prac-
tice. Nor is it clear that nationwide uniformity (as against a
community-based model) is even an appropriate goal. 
We would gain a more meaningful sentencing
process, as judges (or potentially juries) would be effec-
tively invited to contextualize and assess the true
significance of relevant offense characteristics. In so
doing, we would retain a weaker, less demanding form of
uniformity. This is not the same thing as “what the judge
had for breakfast.” We would still have guidelines that
make real distinctions among defendants, at least where
the differences in the blameworthiness of their conduct
are obvious and important. While there would be some
imprecision around the borders, there would also be rela-
tively clear cases in the heartland of each category. 
V. Conclusion
We have a long-standing tradition of subordinating sen-
tencing procedure to sentencing substance. Thus, for
instance, in its 1949 decision in Williams v. New York, the
Supreme Court approved informal sentencing procedures
in order to advance the prevailing substantive sentencing
goal of that era, rehabilitation.61 Likewise, the remedy
opinion in Booker rejected jury-based sentencing because
jury procedures would be inconsistent with a prevailing
objective of this era, outcome uniformity.
By contrast, the Booker merits opinion seems to treat
procedural justice at sentencing as an end in its own right,
not merely as something to be grudgingly doled out just
until it begins to conflict with substantive aims.62 “We will
do the right thing with procedure,” the merits majority
seems to be saying, “and let the substantive chips fall
where they may.” This sort of emphasis on procedural jus-
tice has influenced the Court’s Eighth Amendment capital
sentencing jurisprudence,63 but, until Apprendi, it rarely
played much of a role in noncapital cases.
We should welcome this renewed appreciation for pro-
cedural justice. At the same time, we should recognize
that the vision of procedural justice embodied in Apprendi
and its progeny is a rather parsimonious one, focusing on
jury trial rights for fact-finding in certain limited circum-
stances. In ways that have not yet been well explained by
the Court, these rights seem to arise from concerns about
individual liberty in the face of state power and the demo-
cratic legitimacy of sentencing decisions.64 Faintly visible
in the Court’s reasoning may be a broader imperative that
sentencing procedures embody respect for the essential
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human dignity of criminal offenders. This sort of digni-
tary agenda has been more manifest in capital cases,65
where the Court has also appropriately emphasized that
sentencing procedures should affirm the individual worth
of victims.66
In any event, the Court’s growing interest in proce-
dural justice at sentencing invites fresh thinking about the
subject. I would suggest that the analysis begin with this
question: What procedures will assure both offenders and
victims that they have had a fair chance to tell their sides
of the story to an attentive decision maker who actually
cares about what they have to say?67 In evaluating poten-
tial legislative responses to Booker, for instance, I think it
would be helpful to know how offenders and victims per-
ceive the fairness of sentencing juries. To the extent that
juries can contribute to perceptions of fairness at sentenc-
ing, they ought to receive serious consideration. Of course,
this and other innovations become more feasible and
attractive once we recognize that uniformity is not a cate-
gorical imperative at sentencing, but only one goal to be
pursued along with many others, including procedural
justice. 
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